| Title | Authors | Year | JEL Codes |
|---|
| Market Segmentation Through Information | Elliott, M., Galeotti., A., Koh., A, and Li, W. | [2021] | D43 D83 L13 |
| Generalized linear competition: From pass-through to policy | Genakos, C., Grey, F., and Ritz, R. | [2020] | D43 H23 L51 L93 |
| Mergers, Mavericks, and Tacit Collusion | Darai, D., Roux, C., Schneider, F. | [2019] | C91 D43 K21 L13 L41 |
| Does competition increase pass-through? | Ritz, R. | [2019] | D24 D41 D42 D43 |
| Market Power and Spatial Competition in Rural India | Chatterjee, S. | [2019] | D43 F12 L13 L81 O13 Q13 R12 |
| Production efficiency of nodal and zonal pricing in imperfectly competitive electricity markets | Sarfati, M., Hesamzadeh, M-R., Holmberg, P. | [2019] | C61 C72 D43 L13 L94 |
| Strengths and Weaknesses of the British Market Model | Newbery, D. | [2019] | D43,D47 H23 L94 Q48 Q54 |
| Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part II: Solution Algorithm | Sarfatia, M., Hesamzadeha, M., Holmberg, P. | [2018] | C61 C63 C72 D43 L13 L94 |
| Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part I: Concept Analysis | Sarfatia, M., Hesamzadeha, M., Holmberg, P. | [2018] | C61 C63 C72 D43 L13 L94 |
| Pass-through, profits and the political economy of regulation | Grey, F., Ritz, R. | [2018] | D43 H23 L51 L92 Q54 |
| Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Designs | Hesamzadeh, M., Holmberg, P., Sarfati, M. | [2018] | C61 C63 C72 D43 D47 L13 L94 |
| Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland | Teirila, J. | [2017] | D43 D44 H57 L13 L94 |
| Oligopolistic competition and welfare | Ritz, Robert A. | [2016] | D42 D43 D61 L20 L40 |
| Contracting in a market with differential information | Rocha, M. and Greve, T. | [2016] | D43 D82 L13 |
| Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs | Holmberg, P. and Wolak, F. | [2015] | C72 D43 D44 L13 L94 |
| The robustness of industrial commodity oligopoly pricing strategies | Newbery, D. M. and Greve, T. | [2015] | C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94 |
| Why corporations in developing countries are likely to be even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international finance than their counterparts in the developed world: A Tribute to Ajit Singh | Palma, J. G. | [2015] | B50 D30 D43 E20 F30 F60 G10 G20 G30 N16 N16 016 |
| Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions | Anderson, E. and Holmberg, P. | [2015] | C62 C72 D43 D44 L94 |
| Strategic investment and international spillovers in natural gas markets | Ritz, R. A. | [2015] | D43 F12 L25 L95 |
| Supply function equilibria in transportation networks | Holmberg, P. and Philpott, A. | [2014] | D43 D44 C72 L91 |
| The Strategic Robustness of Mark-up Equilibria | Newbery, D. M. and Greve, T. | [2013] | C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94 |
| On welfare losses due to imperfect competition | Ritz, R. A. | [2013] | D43 D61 L13 L22 L41 |
| Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope | Holmberg, P. and Willems, B. | [2012] | JC73 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94 |
| Emissions Trading with Profit-Neutral Permit Allocations | Hepburn, C. J., Quah, J.-H. and Ritz, R. A. | [2012] | D43 H23 Q58 |
| The roubstness of agent-based models of electricity wholesale markets | Newbery, D. M. | [2012] | C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94 |
| The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions | Holmberg, P. and Newbery, D. M. | [2010] | D43 D44 C62 L94 |
