Volatility, Macroeconomic Policy and Institutions in Resource-Rich Economies

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For over 80 years the Arab region has been deriving massive wealth from its natural resources. Its economic performance has been at the mercy of the ebbs and flows of oil prices and its resources have been slowly depleting. The critical question is how Arab countries might escape the oil curse.

Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies in Resource-Rich Arab Economies focuses on the unique features of the Arab World to explain the disappointing outcomes of macroeconomic policy. It explores the interaction between oil and institutions to draw policy recommendations on how Arab countries can best exploit their oil revenues to avoid the resource curse. Case studies and contributions from experts provide an understanding of macroeconomic institutions (including their underlying rules, procedures, and institutional arrangements) in oil-rich Arab economies and of their political economy environment, which has largely been overlooked in previous research.

Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies in Resource-Rich Arab Economies offers novel macroeconomic policy propositions for exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy, and oil wealth distribution that is more consistent with macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability. These policy reforms, if implemented successfully, could go a long way toward helping the resource-rich countries of the Arab region and elsewhere to avoid the oil curse.
Volatility is a Major Problem in the MENA Region

- It is clear from the MENA region that if commodity price volatility is not managed properly, it can result in higher GDP growth volatility and disappointing long-term economic performance.

- GDP growth volatility in the GCC countries has been at least three times higher than that of Chile and Norway.
The Volatility Curse

► While commodity price booms significantly increase economic growth, volatility affects it negatively (for more details see Mohaddes and Raissi, 2017).

► Fiscal and current account balances of commodity-exporting countries are affected by swings in resources revenues with destabilizing effects on the macroeconomy.

Figure 1: Scatter Plots of GDP Growth and Volatility of CToT against Volatility of GDP Growth, 1981-2014

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Penn World Table Version 9.0 and International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics databases. These are cross-sectional averages over 1981-2014.
The Volatility Curse

- Do natural resource abundant countries have fewer possibilities for technological progress?

- Is the capital accumulation another important channel through which volatility affects GDP per capita growth?

Figure 2: Scatter Plots of CToT Volatility against Real GDP growth, TFP Growth and Capital Accumulation, 1981-2014

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Penn World Table Version 9.0 and International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics databases. These are cross-sectional averages over 1981-2014.
The technological advancements over the last decade have not only reduced the costs associated with the production of unconventional oil, but they have also made extraction of tight oil resemble a manufacturing process in which one can adjust production in response to price changes with relative ease.
Impact of the U.S. Oil Supply Revolution on Real Output (Mohaddes and Raissi, 2018)

Notes: Figures are median (blue solid) and median target (black long-dashed) impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in the price of oil, equivalent to an annualized drop of 51% in year 1 and 45% in year 2, together with the 5th and 95th percentile error bands. The impact is in percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
With oil prices being 50% higher than January 2019, are we in a low oil price environment?

This is not just about low oil prices, but more uncertainty and more volatility.

Bottom line: policy makers should think about volatility as opposed to (just) sustained low or high prices.
New Source of Volatility: the Trump Factor

- President Trump is the new “swing factor” in global oil markets.
- What are the effects of the competing policy objectives of the Trump administration on the oil market?
  - Geopolitical agenda: sanctions on Iran;
  - Domestic political agenda: lowering American petrol prices; and
  - Trade wars with China and the EU.

US OIL DIPLOMACY BY TWEET

US President Donald Trump has tweeted about the oil market 12 times since taking office, with many of the messages causing sharp same-day price drops. However, Trump’s impact on oil prices disappears quickly, according to Kensho Analytics. The analysis looked at the seven tweets most overtly critical of OPEC.
What about OPEC Policy?

- Major source of oil price volatility. Just take the last few years, where an increase in supply has been quickly reversed.
  - In 2015: waging a price war against U.S. shale oil producers;
  - In 2016: maximizing sales before OPEC agreements;
  - In 2018: pressure due to sanctions on Iran and President Trump (as discussed).
Impact of a Negative Oil Revenue Shock for OPEC Countries (Mohaddes and Raissi, 2018)

Notes: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in oil revenue, together with 95 percent bootstrapped confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
The Role of Institutions and Policy Frameworks

- What is the potential role of institutions and policy frameworks, and in particular fiscal policy, in dampening the negative effect of commodity price volatility.


Notes: This volatility is interpreted as the component of discretionary policy which is not related to smoothing the business cycle, such as changes in political preferences or the decision by the politicians to generate a short-term boom so as to keep the population happy—as was seen in the region following the Arab Spring.
The Role of SWFs and Institutional Quality

- SWFs have been established for a variety of reasons, ranging from **fiscal stabilization** (that is to help smooth the impact on government spending of revenues that are large and volatile), to **long-term saving** for future needs of the economy, or of specific groups such as pensioners, or for future generations.

- Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) show that countries that have a SWF have, on average, performed better when it comes to **mitigating the negative growth effects of CToT volatility** and managed to sustain a higher level of capital accumulation in the face of the extreme volatility in resource revenues.

### Table 2: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Origin and Inception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Inception</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Inception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria*</td>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Nigeria*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Qatar*</td>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Non-Commodity</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran*</td>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Venezuela*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Kuwait*</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Some countries have more than one fund, here we have taken the inception year to be that of the first fund, which tends to be the main one. * indicates that the country is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
Is Oil Abundance an Institutional Curse?

In a new volume entitled “Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies in Resource-Rich Arab Economies” (Oxford University Press, 2019), Jeff Nugent (USC), Hoda Selim (IMF) and I argue that while:

- oil revenues over the last half century have greatly lowered the incentive in resource-rich Arab economies (RRAEs) to develop the institutions (including political, fiscal and monetary institutions) that have emerged elsewhere,

- one should note that the GCC countries, because of their revenues (in the form of import duties, fees on religious pilgrims, etc.) and small populations, seem to have not had that incentive even before oil was discovered in the region.

- For instance, prior to oil, given that the current GCC region was largely made up by merchant societies (relatively open to international trade), much of the revenues came from customs duties collected from the merchants, there had thus been little need in these countries to develop the kinds of fiscal institutions capable of raising taxes from the local populations. (Saudi Arabia was an exception as external trade was somewhat less important, and fees obtained from visitors on the Hajj were the most important source of Saudi revenues).
Policy Implications

- While abundance of oil in itself is growth enhancing there are two main problems with this oil income: one is the volatility of oil revenues, and the second is that it accrues to the government.

- The fact that oil revenues accrue to the government tends to make the government less immediately accountable for their policies and actions, and increases incentives for \textit{rent-seeking activities}.
  - Devarajan (2019) shows that in RRAEs accountability is associated with better public expenditure outcomes. To overcome the lack of accountability of governments for oil revenues and also enhance public spending efficiency, he suggests transferring oil revenues directly to citizens and then taxing them.

- The \textbf{quality of institutions} (political, fiscal and monetary) governing macroeconomic policy matter more than the abundance of oil and gas revenues for macroeconomic outcomes including long-run growth and stability.
  - The undesirable consequences of commodity price volatility can be avoided if resource-rich countries are able to improve the \textbf{management of volatility in resource income}: strengthen institutions and policy mechanisms which act as shock absorbers in the face of high levels of oil revenue volatility.
Policy Implications

- Better conduct of fiscal policy.
  - **Revenue re-balancing**: raising non-distortionary taxes, such as consumption tax (VAT) and reducing the dependence on oil revenue;
  - **Improved tax administration**; and
  - **Spending side**: better targeting of subsidies (electricity, water, petrol). Urgent reforms are needed in the area of energy subsidy – which results in waste, economic distortions and air pollution.

- **Diversification is key**, but this does not mean petrochemical industries!
  - It will be **important to reform the economic structure**, increasing transparency and openness to private sector initiatives and foreign investment and improve the business environment in general.

- **Improving the functioning of financial markets** is also a crucial step as this allows firms and households to insure against shocks, decreasing uncertainty and therefore **mitigating the negative effects of volatility on investment and economic growth**.
Concluding Remarks

- **Volatility** is a major problem in the MENA region and macroeconomic policy has not helped!
  - A clear role for institutions and the government (fiscal policy) in offsetting some of the negative growth effects due to the volatility curse.

- The **new oil order** is a serious challenge for the MENA region:
  - in particular for oil-exporting countries, as lower oil prices weaken domestic demand as well as external and fiscal balances;
  - but also for oil importers, as gains from lower oil prices are offset by a decline in external demand/financing by MENA oil exporters given strong linkages between the two groups through trade, remittances, tourism, foreign direct investment, and grants.
  - it implies more uncertainty and more volatility, with adverse effects on economic growth.

- The policy choices are not easy and will most likely require a new social contract.