The economic world of the Bohemian serf: economic concepts, preferences, and constraints on the estate of Friedland, 1583-1692

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The peasant economy, particularly in Europe under serfdom, is widely regarded as 'a completely separate world'. From the disciples of Alexander Chayanov to the adherents of the 'new paradigm', many social scientists view the peasant economy as 'governed by different rules and informed by different values'. Among development economists, concern about agricultural stagnation has generated a widespread orthodoxy: peasants lack the concepts of costs and profits, and abhor markets, money, and individual gain. Among historians of the European past, the same orthodoxy is widely accepted, from Brunner's vision of the 'ganzes Haus' ('whole house') as the economic foundation of pre-industrial society, to Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm's account of European proto-industrialization, to the 'new paradigm' of the Russian peasant economy. All these views share a fundamental belief: peasants make economic decisions in a way that differs from ours, and cannot be understood using standard economics.

Two distinct—although not mutually exclusive—assumptions underlie this belief, one stressing logic and concepts, the other values and preferences. Chayanov painted an evocative picture of the distinctive concepts and 'operational logic' of peasant economics. This led some historians to describe peasants as economically 'irrational' or 'bewildered', while others portrayed them as 'simply different, with their own logic and

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2 Mironov, 'Commune', p. 25.

3 Shanin, 'Chayanov's message', pp. 3-4; Pallot, Land reform, p. 15.


5 Brunner, 'Das "Ganze Haus"'; Kriedte et al., Industrialization; Pallot, Land reform, pp. 15-17, 242, 249.

6 Shanin, 'Chayanov's message', p. 4.
rationality'. But whether 'irrational' or 'differently rational', peasants lack the conventional economic concepts of wages, capital, interest, rent, and profit. Consequently they can neither minimize costs nor maximize profits; instead, they minimize risks and seek to 'satisfice' culturally defined consumption targets. These theories regard peasant minimization of risk as excluding 'capitalist' maximization of profit, a distinction puzzling to mainstream economics, which regards all economic agents as seeking to obtain the lowest possible risk for the highest possible return.

A second strand of thinking emphasizes culturally defined values and preferences. Peasants are held to dislike markets, money, wage labour, borrowing capital, selling land, making profits, individual gratification, new techniques, and new consumer objects. Instead, they prefer autarky, payments in kind, family labour, self-sufficiency, retaining the family farm, satisfying cultural consumption targets, family solidarity, communal altruism, traditional techniques, and customary forms of consumption. Both the distinctive conceptual system and the distinctive preference ordering are regarded as characterizing not just fulltime peasant cultivators, but all members of 'peasant society', including women, servants, and rural craft workers; the 'peasant economy' is seen as a distinct 'economic form' which continues to characterize the rural population 'even in an environment clearly dominated by capitalism'.

History and economic policy have been profoundly influenced by such views. Among economists, the assumption that peasants would not respond positively to development assistance, but would also not respond negatively to deprivation, underpinned the disastrous post-1945 policies of 'squeezing agriculture' to support industry. Among economic historians, these views underlay accounts of how agricultural change, proto-industrialization, and 'forced commercialization' were imposed on an inert rural population. Among historians of Russia, these theories ascribed Russia's centuries of economic stagnation, its divergence from western Europe, the inevitability of violent revolution, and the difficulties of its twentieth-century history, to a distinctive peasant culture. In short, these views imply that it is peasant culture, not the organization of peasant society, that generates exploitation, poverty, and stagnation. Peasant societies cannot change from within, but only through 'forced commercialization' of peasant culture by modernizing landlords, capitalists, or bureaucrats.

These views of peasant economic mentalities pervade our historical

7 Pallot, Land reform, pp. 15-17, 242, 249.
8 Chayanov, 'On the theory', pp. 3-4.
9 Ibid., passim; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, p. 41; Pallot, Land reform, p. 16.
10 Redfield, Peasant society, pp. 18-19, 29-33; Scott, Moral economy, pp. 5-11, 29, 40-3, 184; Shanin, 'Nature', pp. 67-8, 75; Wolf, 'Types', pp. 454-60; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, pp. 41-53, 99-115.
12 Little, Economic development, pp. 149-60.
14 Mironov, 'Commune'; idem, 'When and why?', p. 333; Figes, Peasant Russia, pp. 8-12; Pallot, Land reform, pp. 15-17, 242-9.
picture of central and eastern Europe, both east and west of the Elbe. A long and influential tradition of German historiography has regarded the peasantry as a repository of traditional concepts and values fundamentally opposed to those of modern market society. In 1893 Bücher glorified the pre-capitalist peasant family economy as autarkic, subsistence-oriented, non-maximizing, uninvolved in exchange, and unencumbered by economic concepts of wages, prices, or capital. In 1956, Brunner combined Riehl’s nineteenth-century concept of the ‘ganze Haus’ (‘whole house’) with Chayanov’s views on the ‘peasant economy’, to portray a changeless peasant economic mentality that reified self-subsistence, retreated from the market, rejected cost calculations, and made decisions that were ‘uneconomic’ from the point of view of profitability. These views have strongly influenced most currents in modern German rural history. Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm appealed to both Chayanov and Brunner in describing peasants and proto-industrial workers as rejecting markets, cost calculations, profits, and accumulation, pursuing instead a moral economy of ‘limited goals’. Rössener evoked a Chayanovian peasantry, which avoided markets, ignored profits, pursued limited aims, valued land for its own sake (even when unprofitable), worked for below-market wage rates, minimized risks at all costs, preferred leisure to income, sought culturally defined consumption targets, and made decisions that were ‘economically speaking, unprofitable’. Dipper urged German agrarian historians to adopt Anglo-Saxon anthropologists’ concept of ‘peasant society’, since historical German peasants were distinguished by a ‘specific economic approach, world-view and morality’ and by a ‘special system of norms which tempered social differences’. Bosl characterized German rural society in terms of the autarkic, Brunnerian ‘ganze Haus’ of the peasant, which was only gradually penetrated and destroyed by the advance of ‘rationality’ and ‘individualism’ in the eighteenth century. Peter Blickle and his school described the peasant community as characterized by a longstanding tradition of communalism and egalitarianism, although they did not explicitly claim that these rhetorical strategies in external conflicts reflected peasants’ economic reasoning in daily affairs.

Recent micro-studies of areas both west and east of the Elbe have cast doubt on these traditional views. For early modern Upper Austria, Rebel found that various economic mentalities co-existed in different social strata, with the poorest groups showing careful economic calculation and maximization, even while the better-off supported bureaucrats’ and feudal officials’ ‘notions and practices of moral economy’. For early modern

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15 See the historiographical overview in Dipper, ‘Bauern’.
16 Bücher, Industrial evolution, esp. pp. 88-9, 150-76.
18 Kriedte et al., Industrialization, pp. 41, 43-6, 52-3, 99-100, 106-8, 114-15.
19 Rössener, Peasants, pp. 122-5, 142.
20 Dipper, ‘Bauern’, p. 27.
22 See, for instance, the essays in Blickle, Aufbruch.
23 Rebel, Peasant classes, pp. 118-19.
Württemberg, Sabean rejected the whole Chayanovian concept of the peasant ‘family economy’ as inapplicable to rural decision making, a conclusion borne out in different ways by my own research on proto-industrial and agricultural villages in the Swabian Black Forest. For the Uckermark of Brandenburg, Harnisch characterized peasants as ‘small-scale agricultural entrepreneurs’, transacting in markets, seeking all ‘opportunities for profit’, employing wage labour, pursuing accumulation, and carefully calculating costs. Enders also argued that all social strata in the Uckermark engaged in rational economic calculation, responded to market prices, balanced monetary costs and benefits, transacted eagerly in markets, pursued profits, and manifested every sign of economic and social ‘individualism’. Peters contended that rural people east of the Elbe in general manifested ‘individualistic’ economic behaviour: the preference for leisure, unpunctuality, lack of forward planning, traditionalism, and rejection of innovations so often ascribed to peasant mentalities were strategic components of peasants’ rhetoric of resistance.

But a stubborn affection for distinctive peasant economic mentalities survives: central and eastern European peasants may not have been ‘irrational’, but they were ‘differently rational’. Wunder, while rejecting the stereotype of the ‘stupid peasant’, summarizes recent work on the German peasantry as showing that ‘The different rationalities of lords and peasants are clearly distinguished: for peasants, risk-minimization lies at the centre of economic activity... while for the lords, it is profit-maximization.’ Beck acknowledges that early modern Bavarian villagers were not self-subsistent, worked for wages, and transacted in markets, but claims that most goods and services in the economy flowed through ‘a natural economy which preceded the market and obeyed to some extent quite different laws’. Zimmermann rejects Enlightenment stereotypes of ‘peasant traditionalism’ but describes eighteenth-century German peasants as measuring time in a pre-modern way, minimizing risks irrespective of returns, and preferring self-subsistence to market transaction—adhering to a different rationality that changed only after about 1750.

Where peasant interest in profits, markets, and private property is detected, it is still widely ascribed to exceptional influences: to eighteenth-century (often English) ‘liberal ideologies’, seigneurial weakness, urban pressure, or ‘individualistic’ western legal traditions. Renate Blickle, for instance, contends that early modern Bavarian peasant rhetoric evoked a subsistence-oriented and redistributive ‘principle of needs’ that was only broken down by ‘the development of liberal ideas, especially liberal conceptions of property’ in the eighteenth century—although it is not

24 Sabean, Property, pp. 94-7.
30 Beck, Unterfinning, p. 20.

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clear whether she regards peasants’ legal rhetoric as revealing their everyday economic calculations. Götzsch ascribes the individualistic economic behaviour detected by Enders for the Uckermark to fragmented landlordship there, arguing that ‘probably this individualized form of behaviour did not exist in Schleswig-Holstein’. Zimmermann claims that Uckermark peasants were profit-oriented only because of their proximity to the grain market of a huge city (Berlin): for most other German peasants, he contends, the ‘family economy’ still prevailed, market production was unimportant, costs and benefits were not calculated with respect to prices—‘at least not solely, and before 1750 not at all’. Schulze agrees that German peasants east of the Elbe showed forms of ‘individualistic’ behaviour, but argues that these could not have been found among Polish or Hungarian peasants, since they resulted from the ‘individualistic legal system’ arising out of the reception of Roman Law in early modern central and western Europe.

This line of argument is reflected in the historiography for Europe as a whole. Detailed study of a rural society may reveal that its inhabitants did not ignore costs or abjure profits, but its historians then conclude that this society must have been exceptional—not that prevailing theories about peasant societies might be wrong. Thus, for instance, a synthesis of English local studies leads Macfarlane to argue that pre-industrial England was uniquely ‘individualistic’, distinguishing it from the ‘peasant’ cultures of the continent. Kisch and Thomson respectively ascribe the unusually vibrant agricultural and proto-industrial development of the Wuppertal and the Languedoc to unique regional cultures manifesting individualistic, entrepreneurial, and profit-maximizing behaviour. Landes argues that the individualistic and rational culture of north-western Europe was unique and led to its economic primacy. Even such critics accept that outside unique cultural enclaves, rural people were governed by the distinctive concepts and preferences of the ‘peasant economy’. Other scholars dispute that England, or north-western Europe, or Germany west of the Elbe, were distinctive at all: peasants everywhere, they argue, operated according to the ‘different rationality’ of the moral economy.

This article tackles the question of peasant economics from the other side. It investigates a European rural society with no claim to be ‘western’, ‘advanced’, or uniquely ‘individualistic’. Bohemia (now part of the Czech Republic) was one of those many eastern European societies that, between the sixteenth century and the eighteenth, underwent what has been called the ‘second serfdom’, a massive resurgence in landlord power over the

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32 Blickle, ‘From subsistence’, pp. 377-82; idem, ‘Hausnotdurft’.
33 As quoted in Kaak, ‘Diskussionsbericht’, p. 457.
34 As quoted in ibid., pp. 442-3.
35 As quoted in ibid., pp. 458-9.
36 Macfarlane, Origins.
38 Landes, Wealth, passim.
rural population. Landlords expanded demesne operations, increased money rents and labour dues, extended them to previously exempt social groups, levied new dues on non-agricultural activities, and set up market monopolies. Bohemian serfs did not have the right to appeal to any jurisdiction beyond the manorial courts, and the Crown did not directly intervene between landlords and serfs until Emancipation in 1781. The civil status of the Bohemian rural population corresponds in most respects to Mironov’s seven-point checklist of the characteristics of serf dependence in Russia: juridical subjection; migration regulations; legal attachment to a particular social status; subjection to communal payments and duties; limited right to private property; limited choice of occupation; and unprotected personal dignity. Before Emancipation, Bohemia was similar to other eastern European societies such as Poland, Hungary, or Russia: the rural population was enserfed, severely controlled by landlords and communes, and economically backward compared with western Europe.

The inhabitants of early modern Bohemia may seem ‘a far-away people of whom we know nothing’, but for this very reason they provide an excellent context for testing hypotheses about economic reasoning in traditional societies. If Bohemian peasants are found to use ‘modern’ economic concepts and display ‘individualistic’ preferences, not only does this push the boundaries of modern economic culture much further eastward in Europe than has ever been imagined, but it also casts doubt on the usefulness of ‘peasant culture’ as an explanation for economic stagnation.

This article examines the economic concepts and preferences of Bohemian serfs through a study of one large estate, that of Friedland, located in the north of the country, consisting of about 38 villages and two very small towns. In a 1651 census, the villages contained some 5,000 inhabitants living in about 1,500 households. The entire population of the estate—in both villages and towns—was legally ‘untertanig’ (defined as ‘subjects’ or ‘serfs’ of the lords of Friedland), with the exception of a handful of manorial officials and a few foreign craftsmen who made up less than 1 per cent of the population. The Friedland manorial court kept pledge-books and minute-books, of which 18 volumes survive, recording more than 3,000 separate cases for 67 of the 109 years between 1583 and 1692. This article uses these records to examine the economic concepts, preferences, and behaviour of Friedland serfs in the era of the ‘second serfdom’.

39 On the ‘second serfdom’ in Bohemia, see Maur, ‘Vrchnosti’; on Friedland estate, see Cerman, ‘Gutsherrschaft’; pp. 91–105, 109–49.
40 Hroch and Petrác, Das 17. Jahrhundert; Klima, Economy; Maur, ‘Vrchnosti’; Cerman, ‘Gutsherrschaft’.
41 Maur, ‘Staat’.
42 Mironov, ‘When and why?’, p. 323.
Historians and economists cannot directly observe people’s reasoning processes, but must infer them from statements and actions. Actions are generally preferable to statements, since people are seldom fully conscious of their own conceptual system. Thus, even if economic agents do not explicitly refer to costs or profits, they may still be using these concepts in making decisions. However, if peasants do explicitly perceive and mention costs and profits, and especially if they act on these perceptions, it casts doubt on the view that their conceptual system lacks the categories usually assumed by economists. How did sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Bohemians deal with basic economic concepts?

Let us begin with the concept of the ‘wage’ or cost of labour. The ‘distinctive rationality’ of the peasant household is held to exclude the concept of the cost of time, and historians apply this view widely to the European past: peasants do not have the concept of wage or wage-labour, and ascribe a ‘subjective’ value rather than a money price to their time.43 In early modern Bohemia, however, serfs appear to have taken a rather different view of the costs of their own labour.

The treatment by serfs of labour dues reflects a recognition of the opportunity cost—and the cash value—of labour lost to the family farm. In 1650, for instance, the Friedland serfs agreed to pay 490 Gulden in cash in place of carting 130,000 litres of wheat to the manorial brewery, so as to be ‘spared the carting there and back, in order to be able to earn their piece of bread in other ways during this time’—as clear a statement as one would wish of the concept of the opportunity cost of labour expressed in money terms.44 Serfs paid cash bribes to avoid spending time doing Robot (labour dues, derived from the Czech word for ‘work’): in 1687, for instance, the manager of the Engelsdorf demesne farm was imprisoned because he ‘took it upon himself to accept money from the peasants so that they would not have to go on the Robot’.45 Serfs also employed wage-workers to do their labour dues: in 1688, an Olbersdorf villager complained that the village bailiff had, ‘without the prior knowledge of the community, hired out the raft-wood carting they owed, at a rate of 1 Gulden 6 Kreuzer for each stack, but told them he had to pay more, whereby he had sought to gain advantage from the community’. It subsequently emerged that this piece-rate had been negotiated with the full knowledge of the ‘sworn-men and part of the community that was present’.46 Practices such as negotiating cash commutations, paying bribes, and hiring outside workers to avoid losing household labour to manorial services indicate clearly that serfs had the concept of labour costs.

44 Státní oblastní archiv Litoměřice, pobočka Děčín, Fond Rodinný archiv Clam-Gallasů, Historická sbírka (hereafter SOA Děčín, HS), Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1650-1, fo. 11v, 20 Dec. 1650.
45 SOA Děčín, HS, 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1687-92, 8 March 1687, fo. 43r.
46 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1687-8, 24 Feb. 1688, fo. 35v.
Not just manorial labour services, but also other forms of work, were regarded as deserving payment. In 1650 the Bullendorf village bailiff refused to continue carrying letters, claiming that the increased volume of written manorial commands made the task too onerous; it was agreed that ‘the bailiff shall go on doing the letter-carrying for the time being, but note down the expenses’. In 1685 the community of Dittersbach was described as ‘letting the bailiff be free of the farm-tax, on the grounds that he keeps the registers and accounts for the community, which otherwise they would have had to pay to have done’. Serfs recognized that conveying manorial commands and keeping village registers cost time, they noticed when these costs went up, and they acknowledged that such costs could be written down as ‘expenses’ or a tax reduction.

One might argue that dealings involving manorial or communal officials do not reflect the economic thinking of the ordinary poor women and men who made up the ‘true’ peasant economy. But such humble people also grasped the concept of labour costs and wages. In 1617, for instance, Hans Funcke and George Berger from Hohenwalda explained that they had reneged on an agreement to work for two serfs in Wezwalda because ‘they had been told that the threshing would be done for the 12th bushel, but later it turned out that it was the 15th bushel’. Although paid in kind rather than cash, they could evidently distinguish between a wage of one-twelveth of the output and a wage of one-fifteenth. Even within the family, work was sometimes done for wages, and productivity was monitored carefully. One Saturday in July 1611, for instance, Christoff Wolckstain was working for his cousin Christoff Wildner, and Wildner’s wife asked him, ‘why are you working so slowly?’ Wolckstain answered, ‘that’s what it’s like to be poor, when one’s working for a day-wage’.

Throughout Bohemian society, the explicit statements and concrete decisions of officials, ordinary farm-owners, poor threshers, dependent cousins, and women, demonstrate a clear understanding of the concept of labour costs.

Early modern Bohemian serfs also grasped the economic concept of the ‘opportunity cost of time’. In claims for personal injury compensation, they placed a quantified, monetary value on pain, ill-health, inconvenience, and something they termed ‘Versaümnis’, literally ‘loss of time’. Thus in 1587, Martin Münich from Bertelsdorf injured Bartel Ulrich, a shoemaker’s servant, in a tavern fight, and had to pay him ‘3 Schock for his loss of time’. ‘Versaümnis’ was explicitly distinguished from other costs of injury, as in 1661, when Hans Rössel, a servant from Rückersdorf, complained that Christoph Scholz from Bernsdorf had stabbed him, ‘for which reason he stood in great danger of his life, had great pain, and had to go into a cure in which he spent a considerable time, and in so doing completely consumed the servant-wages he had earned, for which
reason he asks the manorial court to take his part and to mediate it so that the said Christoph Scholz satisfies him for his pain, consumption costs, and loss of time, and also pays the barber-surgeon for the doctor’s fee’.  

One might argue that these were exceptional cases, involving unmarried males formally earning a wage in the labour market, not family members engaged in household production. Inside the peasant household, perhaps time was indeed regarded as incalculable and costless. Apparently not: even the ‘Versäumnis’ of married women had a money value. Thus in 1664, when the Bernsdorf shepherd’s wife was viciously beaten up, the court decided that because her assailants ‘ought to have taken different and more rational consideration, they shall pay for her doctor’s fee, her missed time [Versäumnis] and pain, and a fine into the manorial rents, 6 Schock’. Likewise, in 1685, when Christoff Guttbier’s wife in Rückersdorf was beaten up by a neighbour’s son, his father was ordered to ‘pay Guttbierin, on account of her pain and missed time, 5 Schock in money’. This was a culture in which both wage-earning males and females employed in the household had a clear concept of the cost of their time, which both they and the wider society quantified in money terms.

II

Peasant culture is also held to lack conceptual categories for other costs. For peasants, Chayanov argued, ‘net profit, rent, and interest on capital [are not] real economic categories in the capitalist meaning of the word . . . price, capital, wages, interest and rent . . . cannot even be defined quantitatively’. This view is echoed by many European historians. Friedland serfs, however, took rather a different view of production costs. Interest on capital was one of them. Court records reveal a dense network of rural debts, for which interest was charged and collateral often demanded. Serfs regularly used the term ‘Hauptsumma’ (‘principal’), as in 1589, when Barttel Grolmuss ‘owed Michel Plumbergk from Raspenau 31 Taler Hauptsumma, which he should have paid a long time since’. The concept of ‘Zins’ (interest) also appears regularly, as in 1597, when Hanß Wolckstain from Liewerda was ordered to repay a loan of 24 Schock, ‘along with proper Zins of 4 Groschen on the Schock, properly and gratefully’—an interest rate of 6.67 per cent, encountered in many other Friedland loans. Interest (or some benefit in lieu thereof) was charged even within families, and even on non-cash loans: in 1651 Hanns

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52 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fos. 10-13, 12 April 1661.
53 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fos. 106-7, 3 May 1664.
54 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 18r-v, 7 Sept. 1685.
56 Brunner, ‘Das “Ganze Haus”’, p. 107; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, p. 53; Figes, Peasant Russia, p. 12; Pallot, Land reform, pp. 14-16.
57 SOA Děčín, HS, Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1583-92, 5 Aug. 1589, fo. 62r.
58 Ibid., Kart. 57, Bürgschaftsbuch 1593-1610, fo. 24r, 20 Jan. 1597.

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Thomass in Engelsdorf was ordered 'to satisfy his sister Helena Kruschin in Friedlanz properly for those 2 cows which belong to her 2 daughters, each of which was assessed at 12 Marks 16 Argent, on which the interest has been in arrears up to now'.59 Serfs also placed a cash value on early payment: in 1688 Friedrich Scholtze from Raspenu hired himself out to cart raft-wood for the villagers of Olbersdorf, initially quoting a piece-rate of 1 Gulden 9 Kreuzer per stack, 'but because he was in need of money, he was willing to reduce this sum somewhat, or rebate it, if he could receive his hire-money in two instalments'; eventually he reduced the rate to 1 Gulden 6 Kreuzer per stack, in return for receiving half-payment in advance.60 Thus even a serf so poor that he subsisted by doing the labour dues of richer serfs calculated precisely what modern economists would term his 'discount rate'.

The economic concept of 'rent' was also familiar to Friedland serfs. In 1617 Georg Ullrich from Haindorf paid rent for his use of Michel Nauman's pasture by forgoing the interest on a 50-Schock loan.61 In 1664 Hanß Wildner in Ringenhain was acknowledged to have repaid fully a loan of 20 Schock to Matheß Pülz, 'in that he let a pasture in usufruct to Pülz for some 15 years', a formal agreement recorded in a written contract.62

Investments that improved the value of land were likewise recognized and assigned a money value. In 1687, when the holding he had been leasing was sold to another buyer, Christoph Blumberg pointed out 'that he had sown out 3 Scheffel of seed over winter in well-manured fields, which would reach their best utility only now', a benefit for which the owner was ordered to pay him 9 Gulden.63 When the manor ordered a forced sale of the property of the rebellious Simon brothers in 1615, Hans Sommer observed that 'Adam Simon had purchased this field for 109 Schock, and had lots of manure carted onto it, so that the improvement could well be estimated at 30 Schock'. Adam Nauman told the court that 'Adam Simon had purchased his field when it was quite waste, had invested and manured a lot in it . . . it had had about 7 Viertel of barley, 2 Scheffel of oats, and ½ Scheffel of linseed sown on it . . . Nauman had sold him his piece for 40 Schock in cash, and there was still half a Scheffel of corn on it'. Mertten Horn declared that in his estimation, Simon 'had invested more than 30 Schock this year'. Fabius Rudiger observed that 'Adam Simon's pieces of field lie beside his own field, he [Simon] had carted much onto them, for they had lain quite waste, he had had them cleared of brush, and they had been costly enough at 109 Schock'. All four witnesses, serfs and practising farmers themselves, placed a cash value on the yield of the inputs invested in their neighbour's fields: the 'Verbesserung' (improvement) resulting from what the owner

59 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1650-1, fo. 37v, 2 May 1651.
60 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 35v, 24 Feb. 1688.
61 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 59r, 6 Nov. 1617.
62 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fo. 116, 4 Aug. 1664.
63 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 31r, 23 Dec. 1687.

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had ‘darauf gewendet’ (invested in it). Bohemian serfs may have been poor and many of them may not have been able to read, but they were certainly able to count.

That some serfs were so keenly aware of the cost of inputs and the yield on investments is the more striking when one considers how imperfect and under-developed was the mechanism of price formation in this economy, as shown by this same court-case. Nine neighbours were asked to assess prices for the Simon brothers’ lands in 1615, and three flatly refused. Christoff Scheffer declared ‘that he had inherited his houses and fields, and had in his entire life never purchased anything, could not assess anything and could say nothing’. Michell Girlach testified that ‘he is a young man, and cannot assess anything . . . asks that he be excused; his fields he had obtained with his first wife, and his house he had inherited’. Jochemb Jacobiz said that ‘he does not know what belongs to one person or another, and cannot say anything about this matter’. Lacking dense markets, real-estate listings, and professional advice, early modern Bohemians had to rely on personal maturity and experience to assess land values. But this makes it the more striking that the other six men paid such close attention to the factors affecting the value of their neighbours’ property. All provided nearly identical price estimates for the Simons’ houses, justifying their assessments carefully in terms of size, location, appearance, age, quality of cellars and bathrooms, recent selling-prices of similar properties, and the value at which the owner had accepted the house as his share of the parental inheritance. They also held firm views about when property was over-priced. Hans Sommer reported that ‘Michell Simon accepted a field for 115 Schock, but it was not worth it’. David Wiedemann observed that ‘Adam Simon’s smallholding was just a half-holding, it was divided, and it lies beside the paper-mill; it was 30 Schock too expensive, he himself would not pay 24 Schock for it’. Without professional advice, most agents in modern economies would be reduced to precisely this style of reasoning in pricing their own property, let alone another’s. Early modern Bohemia was not a society in which peasants ‘did not take stock of their crops because they were illiterate, feared their masters and considered it a sin to take stock of what was sent to them by God’. A minority of younger and inexperienced peasants might quail from publicly assessing prices, but experienced older serfs were able and willing to take stock of their own and their neighbours’ crops and all the inputs that went into producing them, despite scarcity of information, imperfection of markets, and paucity of choices.

III

A final modern concept peasants are supposed to lack is that of ‘profit’. Historians accept this widely: Brunner claims that European peasants’

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64 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1611-16, 19 Aug. 1615, fos. 123v-125r.
65 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1611-16, 19 Aug. 1615, fos. 123v-125r.
decisions were ‘uneconomic’ from the point of view of profitability’, Figes that Russian peasants sought ‘the creation of use values . . . as opposed to profit values’, Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm that even rural craftsmen were ‘not governed primarily by the objective of maximizing profit’. Bohemian serfs, however, not only employed several different terms for this concept—‘Vorteil’ (‘advantage’), ‘Gewinn’ (‘gain’, ‘profit’), and ‘Profit’ (‘profit’)—but also acted upon them.

In 1616, when the community of Mildenau complained that their bailiff-tavernkeeper repeatedly ‘kept them into the night with all sorts of [manorial] commands, solely so that his beer would be drunk up’, the court agreed ‘that the bailiff, with his commanding-in, seeks his own advantage [Vorteil] and keeps the poor people until midnight so that he may get rid of his bad beer’. In 1655 Merten Nicht, a 44-year-old peasant from Mildenau, described how he and a neighbour ‘had each loaded a wagon of wine in Austria several months ago, with the intention of selling it with one another, upon profit and loss [auf Gewinn und Verlust]’. In 1662 Christoff Paßig in Schönwalda reported that Friedland butchers ‘were taking it upon themselves to purchase cattle and to resell them immediately, in return for profit-taking [Gewinnnehmung], to foreign butchers across the border’. Nor does this reflect ‘peasant’ disapproval of urban profit seeking, since Paßig reported it only to defend himself against the butchers’ accusations that he himself was seeking illegal profits by selling to foreign butchers who offered better prices.

In 1685 Hans Friedrich Funcke purchased the Lower Mill in Rückersdorf from his stepfather for 150 Schock and immediately resold it for 280 Schock; when the other heirs complained, the court found that Funcke’s step-siblings had already ‘enjoyed 50 Schock profit [Profit] in the selling of the mill’, but that his five full siblings were each to receive 10 Schock ‘from the profited [gewonnenen] 130 Schock’—the modern concept of a ‘claw-back’. Even within families, the concepts of ‘profit’ and ‘gain’ existed, their exact amounts were keenly quantified, and family members sought to maximize their share.

IV

The view that pre-industrial rural people lacked basic economic concepts such as wage, interest, capital, rent, and profit is not borne out by the evidence for early modern Bohemia. But what of the second set of arguments, which holds that peasants have a distinctive preference ordering? Peasants are supposed to avoid markets unless forced to use them by landlords, merchants, or officials, to regard money transactions as incomprehensible and abhorrent, and to ‘satisfice’ modest consumption

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68 Brunner, ‘Das “Ganze Haus”’, p. 107; Figes, Peasant Russia, p. 12; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, p. 41. See also Pallot, Land reform, p. 16; Thomas and Znaniecki, Polish peasant, p. 166.
69 SOA Děčín, HS, Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 3r, 5 Aug. 1616.
70 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1649-55, fo. 196r, 19 June 1655.
71 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fo. 57, 1 Aug. 1662.
72 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 20r, 18 Sept. 1685.
targets rather than ‘maximizing’ profits. The main concrete evidence adduced to support these views is that only a small share of peasant output is brought onto markets, which remain primitive and underdeveloped in most peasant economies.\(^73\)

In early modern Bohemia, as we have seen, markets were not very highly developed: prices and costs were hard to calculate, payments were often made in kind, information was imperfect, and risks were high. But when we observe such an economy, should we assume it is thus because its agents prefer to avoid money, markets, and gain? Or should we ask whether other, external constraints were preventing markets from working well? Markets function poorly in the absence of supportive institutions—notably, though not exclusively, state institutions—that disseminate information, prevent extortion, and enforce contracts. They function poorly in the presence of institutions—such as feudal rules, guild privileges, trade barriers, and unequal treatment under the law—that enforce monopolies, increase costs, and push certain transactions into the black market. Were early modern Bohemian markets underdeveloped because Bohemian serfs abhorred market transactions, or because Bohemian institutions placed obstacles in the way of such transactions?

Let us begin by examining the attitude to buying and selling on the market. Most theorists tell us that peasants dislike and avoid market transactions.\(^74\) This is supposed to have been especially true in the past: as Polanyi put it, the market economy ‘is an institutional structure which . . . has been present at no time except our own . . . the alleged propensity of man to barter, truck and exchange is almost entirely apocryphal’.\(^75\) These views are particularly widely held among historians of central and eastern Europe.\(^76\) But how did Bohemian serfs actually act?

Imperfect though their markets were, Friedland serfs used them, not only voluntarily but eagerly. Market transactions with trading partners outside the estate appear in the earliest surviving court records. In the period of only 12 months from December 1585 to December 1586, for instance, we find Hans Bielach from Ringenhain importing apples worth 4 Mark from a man in Brünn (Brno), Martin Scherer from Raspenau buying wheat and corn worth 15 Schock 45 Groschen from a butcher in Reichenberg, Paul Raffegerst from Niedenveigsdorf selling stolen corn to a Zittau merchant, and Simon Lorenz from Niedenveigsdorf importing beer worth 13 Schock from Zittau.\(^77\) Although Reichenberg was on a


\(^75\) Polanyi, Great transformation, pp. 37, 44.

\(^76\) Brunner, ‘Das “Ganze Haus”’, p. 107; Thomas and Znaniecki, Polish peasant, p. 184; Galeski, Basic concepts, p. 37; Shanin, ‘Russian peasant household’, p. 32; Mironov, ‘When and why?’, pp. 336, 343; Figes, Peasant Russia, p. 12; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, pp. 44-5.

\(^77\) SOA Decin, HS, Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1583-92, fo. 17r, 4 Dec. 1585; fo. 22r, 7 Feb. 1586; fo. 23r, 14 March 1586; fo. 33r, 1 Dec. 1586.
neighbouring estate, Zittau was over the border in Lusatia, and Brno was hundreds of kilometres away. Friedland serfs continued to trade grain, cattle, foodstuffs, and beer outside the estate throughout the seventeenth century, despite the risks of war and the advance of the ‘second serfdom’. To give just a flavour of these transactions, in 1617 Hans Buchelt from Bullendorf was exporting horses to Zittau and had considerable debts in the city;

78 in 1627 Merten Lange of Hohenwalda and Mertten Wildner of Hermsdorf were importing salt from Bautzen (in Sorbia) and selling it to villagers inside and outside the estate;79 in 1645 Hans Weise from Mildenau was importing beer from Görlitz (in Silesia);80 and in 1685 serfs from all over the estate were selling calves to the son of a butcher from Böhmischt Neustadt who was exporting them abroad.81

Bohemian serfs also traded actively in proto-industrial goods. In 1587 Michel Schöffler from Bernsdorf was purchasing linen yarn and selling it outside the estate.82 In 1611 Hans Peuckner from Raspenau sold 10 hanks of yarn to a Friedland weaver for 3 Schock.83 In 1617 Paul Augsten sold Hans Ulrich in Haindorf a quarter of corn worth 60 Groschen, in return for ‘30 small tankards, which he carted to Görlitz’.84 In 1627 Hans Rößell from Rükersdorf exported 100 Taler worth of paper to Frankfurt an der Oder,85 and Baltezer Reinhalt from Weisbach got into conflict over his large-scale purchases of linen yarn.86 In 1650 Christoff Helwig, a Rükersdorf village ‘merchant’ (Handelsmann), prosecuted the widow of his former business partner for a debt of 32 Reichstaler ‘coming from Leipzig, where he had some wares lying’. The widow described how her husband and Helwig had ‘carted linen to Leipzig with one another, and because it could not be sold, they left it lying there with Georg Hagg, and when her husband travelled to Leipzig next time he sold this linen, with Helwig’s agreement, in exchange for other wares’.87

In 1652 Christof Herbig, a Mildenau lodger, and Christof Walter, a Raspenau peasant, got into conflict over several cartloads of shingle boards which they bought from a board cutter in Raspenau to export to Görlitz.88

So normal were market transactions that serfs, male and female, acquired commercial reputations. In 1656 Michel Volckelt from Heinersdorf denied standing pledge for Christoph Scheler in a debt of 17 Reichstaler for imported Greifenberg honey, ‘since he would never have entered into guarantorship for Scheler alone . . . [as] Scheler is a poor

78 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 32r, 15 April 1617.
79 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1627, fo. 45r, 23 Oct. 1627.
80 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1645, fo. 73r, 29 July 1645.
81 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 1r, 12 March 1685.
82 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1583-92, fo. 36r, 8 March 1587.
83 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1611-16, fo. 2v, 30 May 1611.
84 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 59r, 6 Nov. 1617.
85 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1627, fo. 1r, 2 Feb. 1627.
86 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1627, fo. 2v, 5 Feb. 1627.
87 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1650-1, fo. 2v-3r, 18 Oct. 1650.
88 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1649-55, fo. 155r, 31 July 1652.
payer'. In 1662 Jacob Gähler's wife in Ringenhain complained that Georg Mentzel had been maliciously claiming that 'every week from her two cows she sold butter to a value of 17 Kaisersgroschen and milk to a value of 9 Groschen'. Mentzel denied saying anything about her milk-sales, but admitted remarking that 'one week, from 2 cows, she had made 17 basins of butter, each selling for 3 Kreuzer'. Another villager admitted 'that people were saying how in one week Jacob Gähler's wife sold butter for 17 Kaisergroschen; he himself had a cow, but when his wife made butter on Saturday no-one paid him 2 Groschen for it'. Further questioning revealed three men and two women, not just in Ringenhain but in the surrounding villages, discussing this woman's reputation for marketing her dairy products. Witness after witness repeated the precise inputs, output, and money sales involved: 2 cows, 1 week, 17 basins of butter, 3 Kreuzer per basin, 17 Groschen butter sales, 9 Groschen milk sales. Nor was Gähler's wife an isolated case. Christoph Gerlach's wife made a similar complaint, claiming that a neighbour's wife had maliciously remarked 'that in one week she sold butter for 11 Groschen'. Witness statements revealed a network of three women and an unknown number of customers in the village tavern discussing this woman's market reputation. Again, each witness gave precise figures: 1 cow, 1 week, 3 basins of butter, 11 Groschen weekly butter sales, 3 Groschen daily milk sales. The woman herself was reported as boasting about her marketing prowess. Faced with such evidence, it is difficult to claim that the peasant family was reluctant to sell on the market. To sell their output, these two women were even willing to risk accusations of witchcraft from envious neighbours—who did not question their market participation, but only the sources of their success.

V

Peasants—both in modern developing countries and in pre-industrial Europe—are also widely portrayed as recoiling from the use of money, which they dislike and do not understand. Outsiders who regard themselves as superior to peasants have described them thus for hundreds of years: as one English traveller wrote of Indian peasants in the 1670s, 'Money is inconvenient for them: give them Victuals and an Arse-Clout, it is enough'. Such statements are informative about the conceptual categories of those who make them. But are peasants really like this?

The regularity with which Bohemian serfs calculated money costs and engaged in money transactions already casts some doubt on this view. Further evidence is provided by their debt relationships. Friedland serfs were enmeshed in a network of debt and credit, not just within the

89 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1656-60, fo. 6v, 21 Nov. 1656.
90 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fos. 55-7, 3 July 1662.
91 Ibid.
92 Shanin, 'Russian peasant household', p. 32; idem, 'Nature', p. 75; Thomas and Znaniecki, Polish peasant, p. 164; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, pp. 41, 100.
93 Cited in Landes, Wealth, p. 165.
commune, or even among the 38 villages of the estate, but extending to settlements far away in Bohemia and Saxony. The dimensions of one serf’s credit network are shown by Georg Ulrich, a Haindorf peasant who died in 1617, leaving a list of debts and loans outstanding with 16 people. The sums involved ranged from less than 1 Schock to 50 Schock (more than 20 per cent of the value of his farm). The goods traded for these cash sums included beer, corn, oats, wood, ashes, barrel-wood, tankard-wood, wooden wares, wooden tankards for export to Saxony, and the tenancy of a pasture. His monetary dealings extended to women (one widow and a married woman whose husband was not mentioned), and into the poorest social strata: one debtor was so poor that ‘before the harvest she had had no bread in three weeks, and had boiled buckwheat loaves for her four children’, and one had ‘had two of his children die of hunger this winter’.

Even unmarried youths possessed and used money. In 1662, a villager serving on the demesne farm had more than 8 Reichstaler in cash savings, which was stolen by a younger servant. In a betrothral conflict of 1687, the bulk of the court proceedings consisted of a description of how the young man ‘had bought and given the wench the following things: a pair of shoes for 56 Kreuzer, stockings for 36 Kreuzer, pearstones . . . for 27 Kreuzer, ribbons . . . for 1 Gulden 30 Kreuzer, and as a contribution to a bonnet 22 Kreuzer 3 Pfennig’. The young woman was ordered to repay the sum of 3 Gulden 22 Kreuzer 3 Pfennig, Hans to repay her 30 Kreuzer for a handkerchief she bought him. The entire relationship had been structured in terms of gifts purchased for money, whose value was precisely re-collected, and which had to be repaid in cash when the relationship broke down.

In some ways, Bohemian serfs had to develop a greater sophistication with monetary instruments than most agents in modern economies, since they had to deal with three parallel currencies (Gulden, Mark, and Taler), persistent devaluations, and private counterfeiting. The well-known devaluation of the Bohemian currency by a coining consortium with imperial privileges complicated peasant debt relations throughout the 1620s, and court conflicts relied on serfs’ detailed calculations of exchange rates between ‘good money’ and ‘bad’. Peasants also recognized counterfeit coins, as in 1686 when the Berndorf tavern-keeper incurred the wrath of a customer by rejecting his coin, on the grounds that ‘it was a false Gulden’. Bohemian serfs had to be—and were—closely aware of the exchange rates among the various currencies in circulation, and the difference between good coinage and bad. They lacked neither willingness to use money nor understanding of its value.

94 SOA Děčín, HS, Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 59v, 6 Nov. 1617.
95 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fo. 55, 3 July 1662.
96 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 2r, 29 Jan. 1687.
97 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1627, fo. 1r, 2 Feb. 1627; Amtsprotokolle 1629-30, fo. 3r, 30 March 1629; fo. 4r, 4 April 1629.
98 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 41r, 4 June 1686.
Finally, peasants’ preferences are supposed to be distinguished by their indifference to maximizing individual profits or gain. Instead, peasants are regarded as seeking to minimize risks and ‘satisficing’ a modest, culturally defined consumption target. This is perhaps the most universally accepted tenet of ‘peasant economics’, and is particularly widespread among historians of eastern and central Europe. It is difficult to judge whether Bohemian serfs sought ‘a culturally recognized standard of consumption’ rather than ‘the maximum possible economic results’, since it is hard to assess what the cultural standard or feasible maximum would have been. But, as we have seen, Friedland serfs did explicitly use the concepts of ‘advantage’ and ‘profit’, and monitored and quantified their own gain in practice. Moreover, they showed a keen concern to reduce their costs and increase their earnings: since profits are merely the difference between earnings and costs, the end effect was to attain higher profits.

One source of evidence that serfs sought to reduce their costs is their perpetual violations of the manorial milling prerogative, whereby each serf was tied to a specific miller, who paid a share of his take to the overlord. Serfs regularly risked fines and imprisonment by employing millers who charged them less. Such cost minimization was not restricted to substantial peasants, but reached far down into the rural sub-strata. In 1598, for instance, Michel Rössel from Schönwalda, ‘a poor man who has little property’, was imprisoned and sentenced to hard labour for milling outside the estate. In 1651 Christoph Zickhert in the barren hill-hamlet of Hohenwalda was likewise punished for regularly milling in other lords’ mills. Serfs explicitly justified their evasion of manorial mills in terms of poor value for money, as in the case of the villagers of Göhe who complained in 1687 that their miller, because of his monopoly, was neglecting their grain during a good harvest.

It might be argued that serfs evading manorial mills were not minimizing cost but engaging in class struggle: seeking profits against the overlord was culturally acceptable, seeking them from neighbours was not. But Friedland serfs also sought advantage from each other—in trade, land sales, and daily life. In 1655 two Mildenau peasants were importing Austrian wine: their explicit purpose was ‘to sell it with one another, upon profit and loss’, and they took for granted that they would seek to cheat each other out of part of the profits. Profit seeking was also widespread in peasant land transactions. In 1589 Jacob Leubner sold his Neiderweigsdorf farm to Michel Ehrentraut, but ‘moved the equipment

100 Imhof, Lost worlds, p. 5; Mironov, ‘Commune’, p. 21; idem, ‘When and why?’, p. 333; Kriedte et al., Industrialization, pp. 41, 52.
102 SOA Děčín, HS, Kart. 57, Bürgschaftsbuch 1592-1610, fo. 33r, 23 Feb. 1598.
103 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1650-1, fo. 16r, 13 Jan. 1651.
104 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Friedland) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fo. 20v, 9 Sept. 1687.
105 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1649-55, fo. 196r, 19 June 1655.
away from it secretly'. In 1611 Christoff Wolckstain accused his richer cousin Christoff Wildner of having obtained his smallholding ‘by villainously presenting ½ Schock to the estate captain’. In 1627 Christoff Strack claimed that his Raspenau neighbour Jacob Weickert ‘had come by his farm in a villainous way with Kippen und Wippen [depreciated coinage]’. In 1650 Martha Kellerin from Haindorf accused her son Hans of violating her retirement contract and reneging on loans of 60 Schock; she demanded help from the court ‘to get back what is hers’. In 1664 Christoph Neußer Junior from Mildeneichen bought a cottager holding, but was found to have concealed information that would have increased the price by 6 Schock.

In daily life, too, thefts and frauds were rife—not just of wood or food, but also of cash. In 1595 Hanß Paul from Dörfel accused Georg Kaulfers from Niederweigsdorf of ‘taking a 15-Pfennig piece’. In 1662 Georg Schäffer from Hohenwalda stole more than 8 Reichstaler from a fellow-servant with whom he slept; this was not simply an exceptional violation in a normally trusting society, as shown by the fact that his fellow-servant had locked the money away in his store-chest, and Schäffer stole the key out of his trousers at night. Theft was omnipresent in households and communities, and Friedland serfs routinely suspected one another of seeking dishonest gain.

Even in leisure, Bohemian serfs kept a close watch on their purses. In the village tavern, a group of serfs drinking together would pay for their beer individually, and carefully count their share. In 1617, when a group of Dittersbach serfs were paying their beer-tab in the tavern, the one deputed to collect the money for the whole group reportedly said, ‘I will count it one more time so that neither I nor any of you is wronged’. Another witness recounted how ‘they were paying the beer-tab, and Hans Hennig collected the money, and then he (the witness) said to him, there will be one tankard over, whereupon Tzschanter told Hennig he would bet with him for a tankard of beer, but Hennig replied that he did not trust him, and counted the money one more time’. It is hard to see this as a moral economy of altruism and reciprocity, in which agents satisfied culturally defined basic needs and ‘put community interest before personal interest’. Rather it was one in which, even in sociability within the commune, each individual calculated his beer-tab separately, and suspected others of seeking gain at his expense.

106 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1583-92, fo. 61r, 30 May 1589.
107 Ibid., Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1611-16, fo. 6v, 6 July 1611.
108 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1627, fo. 16v, 26 March 1627.
109 Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1649-55, fo. 96r, 4 June 1650.
110 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fo. 114, 20 May 1664.
111 Ibid., Kart. 57, Bürgschaftsbuch 1593-1610, fo. 13v, 3 Jan. 1595.
112 Ibid., Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fo. 55, 3 July 1662.
113 Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 70v, 29 Dec. 1617.
114 Pallot, Land reform, p. 249.
For a full characterization of the economic world of the serf, one would ideally wish to assess the extent of market participation, use of money, and profit orientation by different sections of the rural population. This, however, would require quantitative data which are unavailable for most pre-industrial peasant economies. In the absence of such information, it is impossible to reach a definitive judgment about what proportion of which social groups in the Bohemian countryside used money, participated in markets, and tried to improve their economic position, just as it is impossible to evaluate what proportion of inputs and outputs in the rural economy was traded in markets rather than being supplied and consumed within households. However, the fact that by 1591 half of all serf households on the estate of Friedland were smallholders and cottagers who lacked sufficient land to feed a family suggests that by the late sixteenth century a considerable proportion of the rural population must have been transacting constantly in markets for labour and food. Furthermore, the data presented in this article, qualitative though they are, show that economic agents of all social groups and both sexes did use money, transact in markets, and seek economic advantage; and that they lacked neither the necessary conceptual tools nor the requisite preferences. It is certainly possible that we are observing exceptional individuals whose concepts and preferences were quite alien to those of their neighbours. But the absence of any moral condemnation of their activities—even on the part of those in conflict with them—casts doubt on this view. Moreover, the sheer frequency and matter-of-factness of references to money, markets, and profit seeking suggests that there was nothing surprising about them to early modern Bohemian serfs. Nor, when serfs did transact in markets, is there any evidence that they were being forced to do so by modernizing landlords, capitalistic townsmen, or enlightened princely officials. To the extent that such activities were not universal in this economy, this seems less likely to have resulted from inner differences in concepts or values than from external constraints. Some of these constraints, indeed, emanated precisely from landlords, townsmen, and officials.

The proliferation of landlord monopolies and monopsonies was a substantial, although not insuperable, obstacle to market participation. In 1586, when two Friedland butchers were buying up peasants’ cattle for onward export, the obstacle to continuation of this lively trade was not a reluctance on the part of the large network of serfs to sell their cattle on the market, but rather the manorial prerogative obliging serfs to offer cattle first to the landlord at preferential prices before selling elsewhere.

When Jacob Wildner from Mildenau stopped exporting chickens to Seid-
enberg in 1586, it was not because Wildner was culturally reluctant to transact in markets, but rather because he was thrown into gaol for violating manorial export restrictions.\textsuperscript{118} When Georg Geissler from Ullersdorf stopped importing beer from Zittau for sale in the estates of Friedland and Lichtenberg in 1645, this was not because he was unwilling to seek profits or engage in commerce, but because he was imprisoned for violating the manorial beer monopsony.\textsuperscript{119} Nor was the proto-industrial sector characterized by the cultural abyss between subsistence orientation by rural craftsmen and profit maximization by urban merchants postulated by Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumberh.\textsuperscript{120} Quite the contrary. When the Bernsdorf villager Michel Schöffer was prevented from ‘regrating’ linen yarn from fellow-serfs (and spurred to emigrate illegally) in 1587,\textsuperscript{121} when two Rückersdorf villagers were hindered from illegally exporting yarn in 1604,\textsuperscript{122} or when rural weavers throughout the estate failed to sell their linens to outside merchants in 1619,\textsuperscript{123} it was not because they felt any cultural reluctance to seek commercial profits, but because the Friedland manor enjoyed purchasing prerogatives on linen yarn and had sold the monopsony over buying its serfs’ linen cloth to a Nuremberg merchant company for a fat commission.

A second hindrance to market participation by serfs was the actions of princely officials. Far from pursuing any ‘modernizing’ strategy of forcing peasants into markets to earn cash for taxes (as is often claimed), Bohemian bureaucrats hindered many market transactions which serfs already conducted. In 1650, for instance, the Prague government imposed new tolls on all Bohemian wares exported to Lusatia, and refused to temper them despite protests from the Friedland manor that ‘our poor people, who have very sparse arable cultivation, and have to earn a living with wood-wares and the like, and earn a bare livelihood with this, would be totally cast to the ground’.\textsuperscript{124} Of course, these trade barriers did not stop exports by serfs, but merely pushed them underground, creating opportunities for rent seeking and also increasing their risks and costs.\textsuperscript{125} The serf wood-workers, linen-weavers, carters, and grain-traders of the estate of Friedland showed no cultural revulsion from international trade, but were prevented from expanding their participation in it by obstructive officials.

‘Capitalistic’ townsmen did not impose commerce and the profit motive on a subsistence-oriented rural economy, but rather constituted a third set of hindrances to market participation by willing serfs. Guided urban craftsmen waged a perpetual struggle against peasant attempts to ‘encroach’ on their monopolies. East of the Elbe, guilds were generally

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 2 Sept. 1586.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1645, fo. 52v, 26 June 1645.
\textsuperscript{120} Kriedte et al., \textit{Industrialization}, pp. 41-53, 99-115.
\textsuperscript{121} SOA Děčín, HS, Kart. 77, Amtsprotokolle 1583-92, fo. 36r, 8 March 1587.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., Kart. 57, Bürgschaftsbuch 1593-1610, fo. 50r, 9 Jan. 1604.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., Kart. 78, Amtsprotokolle 1616-19, fo. 153r, 4 March 1619; fo. 204r, 21 Sept. 1619.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1649-55, fo. 103r, 14 June 1650.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1650-1, fos. 19v-20r, 24 Jan. 1651; \textit{Ibid.}, HS, Kart. 79, Amtsprotokolle 1656-60, fo. 24, 11 Jan. 1657.
weaker than those in western parts of the Empire, since whenever they conflicted with landlord interests they were ignored. But in cases where manorial officials saw no harm (or even a benefit) to the landlord from enforcing guild privileges, they did so. In 1662, for instance, the Friedland butchers' guild brought a Schönwalda villager called Paßig to court for selling an ox to a 'foreign' butcher, bypassing their privileges; he in turn accused a Friedland butcher called Herwig of illegally exporting cattle. In the end, both Paßig and Herwig paid large fines to the manor and smaller ones to the guild, and were forbidden to continue their 'profit seeking' (Gewinnsnehmung).\textsuperscript{126} In 1686, likewise, the Friedland potters' guild reported a 'very impoverished' Ringenhain villager called Neumann for having 'taken it upon himself... to have a kiln-oven built and set in his parlour by an encroaching potter, the clay for which is taken from Seibt's farm... [which] is counter to the privileges which they possess'. The manor fined Neumann 10 Reichstaler because he 'did not petition the manor for permission... and, besides, the potter craft should be protected in their guild articles'.\textsuperscript{127} It was urban corporatism, not rural subsistence-orientation, that stifled peasant market participation in these cases.

A final set of constraints on the peasant economy was the sheer ubiquity of manorial rents and dues. This turned serfs themselves into their neighbours' closest monitors, who could be trusted to mobilize manorial regulations to protect their own position. The manorial dues charged to village bakers, for instance, created incentives for licensed bakers, such as those in Rüickersdorf in 1645, to report to the manor 'the other bakers, who do not have themselves written down in the manorial court, conduct their baking freely, and do not render any dues'.\textsuperscript{128} In 1651, the Ober- and Niederwittig bakers reported that Christoph Zickhert from Hohenwalda was baking bread and rolls and hawking them around various villages, thereby 'encroaching on the bakers who bake in these villages, and have to pay manorial dues to do so'; cleverly, they also alleged that Zickhert was milling in foreign mills and failing to pay manorial dues on his bakery, thereby also defrauding the manor. Despite Zickhert's claim that he actually possessed a manorial licence, he was prohibited from hawking bread in other villages, milling in foreign mills, and baking at all unless he paid higher dues.\textsuperscript{129} Zickhert's entrepreneurial activities were not rendered impossible by any cultural unwillingness on his part to participate in markets, minimize his milling costs, or maximize his profits by moving into new markets and undercutting established producers, but rather by the complaints of his fellow-serfs, forced to seek rents within the manorial system in order to survive.

How, then, can we characterize the economic world of the Bohemian serf? As the evidence presented in this article has shown, pre-industrial
Bohemia has no claim to be a unique enclave of economic modernity. Its rural economy suffered from lack of information, sparse transactions in many sectors, high risks, frightening insecurity, grinding poverty, and starvation for some of the poorest. Living standards, at least as far as these can be measured by life expectancies, were low by European standards. Although in the nineteenth century Bohemia was to become the industrial powerhouse of the Habsburg lands, in 1583 this unleashing of its economic potential lay more than two centuries in the future. Yet Bohemian serfs showed a clear understanding of ‘modern’ economic concepts such as wage, price, rent, capital, interest, and profit, and an unmistakable eagerness to transact in markets, use money, and improve their individual economic position—wherever this was possible in the interstices of a highly constraining institutional framework.

These findings have two main implications. First, they push the boundary of ‘modern’ economic culture much further eastward in Europe than has usually been imagined, and open the possibility that it may be pushed further still—indeed, outside Europe altogether. Second, they cast doubt on the usefulness of ‘peasant culture’ as an explanation for economic stagnation. Many social scientists have ascribed development failures in rural economies, both in the modern Third World and in pre-industrial central and eastern Europe, to distinctive concepts and preferences among peasants, which prevent them from minimizing costs, maximizing profits, participating in markets, and adopting new techniques and practices in response to changes in constraints. A complete understanding of why serf economies in central and eastern Europe were poor and undeveloped must await a more thorough analysis of their functioning. However, available evidence for the estate of Friedland suggests strongly that the obstacles to economic success for Bohemian serfs, and hence those aspects of their economic world on which we must focus, were external and institutional, not inward and cultural.

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Footnote references

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