

Curriculum Vitae

Sönje K. Reiche

CONTACT DETAILS:

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EMPLOYMENT

2004 – University Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge and Fellow of Newnham College
2001 – 2004 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

VISITING POSITIONS

2003 – 2004 Visiting Lecturer, Department of Economics, London School of Economics
2000 – 2001 Visiting Researcher, IDEI, University of Toulouse

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization

EDUCATION

1996 – 2001 PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, Thesis: “Contract Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information; on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”,
Advisor: John Hardman Moore
1995 – 1996 MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics
1992 – 1995 “Diplom” (MSc) in Mathematics, University of Bonn
Thesis: “On the non-trivial roots of the Riemann Zeta Function”
1989 – 1992 “Vordiplom” (BSc) in Mathematics, University of Heidelberg

ACADEMIC HONOURS AND AWARDS

Marie Curie Fellowship at IDEI, Toulouse (2000 – 2001)
ECONOMICA Scholarship, London School of Economics (1999 – 2000)
Marie Curie Fellowship, TMR Program, European Commission (1996 – 1999)
Scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (1995 – 1996)
Teaching Prize for economics part time teachers LSE (1997)

JOURNAL ARTICLES

“Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility”, (with Bob Evans), forthcoming *Economics Letters*.

“Ambivalent Investment and the Hold-Up problem”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, December 2006, 4(6), 1148-1164.

“Dynamic Yardstick Mechanisms”, (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud), *Games and Economic Behaviour*, February 2006, 52(2), 316-335.

WORKING PAPERS

“Robust Incentives and Non-Exclusive Contracts”, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics No. 729, revised 2008, submitted to *Games and Economic Behaviour*.

“Sequential Screening and Renegotiation”, revised 2008, submitted to *Journal of Economic Theory*.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Moral Hazard and Costly Borrowing”, 2007

“Implementation under Asymmetric Information and Renegotiation: An Example “, 2006 (with Bob Evans)

“Modelling Prejudice” (with Godfrey Keller and Michele Piccione)

TEACHING

University of Cambridge

- Linear Algebra (Paper 6, Part IIA)
- Corporate Finance (Paper 1, Part IIB)
- Choice under Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium (Paper 4, Part IIB)
- Choice under Uncertainty; General Equilibrium (MPhil, PhD)
- Corporate Finance (MPhil)

University of Pennsylvania:

- Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
- Industrial Organization (Undergraduate)

London School of Economics

- Advanced Microeconomics (PhD)
- Advanced Economic Theory (PhD)
- Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
- Mathematics for Economists (PhD)
- Economics B (Undergraduate)
- Game Theory for Mathematicians (Undergraduate)

REFEREE:

- American Economic Review
- Econometrica
- Economic Journal
- European Economic Review
- International Economic Review
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- RAND Journal of Economics
- Review of Economic Studies

EXTERNAL SEMINARS

Birkbeck (2004), Boston University (2000), University of Cambridge (2004/2000), GSB Chicago (2000), City University (2006), University of Edinburgh (2006), University of Essex (2003), Humboldt University (2001), MEDS Kellogg (2000), London School of Economics (2005), University of Munich (2001), Oxford University (2000), HEC Paris (2004/2000), University of Pennsylvania (2001/2000), Royal Holloway (2003), IDEI Toulouse (2001/2000), UCL (2000).

CONFERENCES

EEA (2006/2002/2001/1999), ESEM (1999), Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee (2008/2006/2004/2001), Conference on Contract Theory, Stony Brook (2001), Conference on Contract Enforcement and Incompleteness, Siena (2000), Summer in Tel Aviv (1999), Royal Economic Easter School on Evolutionary Game Theory and Incomplete Contracts, Birmingham (1997)

LANGUAGES

German, English, French (fluent)
Italian, Russian (basic)