Aidt, T. S.

Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

CWPE1621

Abstract: The paper studies the influence of Gordon Tullock (1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

Keywords: Rent seeking, Corruption

JEL Codes: D72

Author links: Toke Aidt  

PDF: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1621.pdf

Open Access Link: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5801

Published Version of Paper: Rent seeking and the economics of corruption, Aidt, T. S., Constitutional Political Economy (2016)

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