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Faculty of Economics

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Shvets, J.

Presidential control of the judiciary via the appointment of power: evidence from Russia

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Abstract: In many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges. Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of Russia, where judges are often said to favor the executive. I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges selected by the president favor the government more than do their peers. In the process, the article develops a new solution to the sample selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions.

JEL Codes: D02, K40, P37

Publisher's Link: https://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/04/18/jleo.eww004.abstract?sid=8f18f1d7-800d-4a5d-8d7b-efa90659c188



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