| Title | Authors | Year | JEL Codes |
|---|
| An evaluation of a local reactive power market: the case of Power Potential | Anaya, K. L. and Pollitt, M. G. | [2021] | D44 D47 L94 Q40 |
| Designing an incentive-compatible efficient Renewable Electricity Support Scheme | Newbery, D. | [2021] | D44 D62 D86 H23 H25 L94 Q28 Q42 Q48 |
| The private and social value of British electrical interconnectors | Newbery, D., Gissey, G., Guo, B. and Dodds, P. | [2019] | C54 D40 D44 F14 D47 H23 L94 Q48 |
| Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets | Ahlqvist, V., Holmberg, P., Tangeras, T. | [2019] | D44 L13 L94 |
| Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment | Eldridge, B., O’Neill, R., Hobbs, B. | [2018] | C60 C72 D44 D47 L94 |
| Strategic behaviour in a capacity market? The new Irish electricity market design | Teirilä, J., Ritz, R. | [2018] | D44 H57 L13 L94 |
| UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: Emerging Lessons | Grubb, M., Newbery, D. | [2018] | L94 D44 |
| A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market | Greve, T., Teng, F., Pollitt, M. and Strbac, G. | [2017] | D44 L94 |
| Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland | Teirila, J. | [2017] | D43 D44 H57 L13 L94 |
| What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative? | Newbery, D. | [2017] | D44 L51 L94 Q40 Q48 Q51 |
| A future auction mechanism for distributed generation | Greve, T. and Pollitt, M. | [2016] | D44 Q41 |
| Economic zones for future complex power systems | Greve, T. and Greve, T. and Patsios C. and Pollitt, M. and Taylor, P. | [2016] | D44 D85 Q42 |
| A VCG Auction for Electricity Storage | Greve, T. and Pollitt, M. | [2016] | D44 D85 Q42 |
| Intraday Markets for Power: Discretizing the Continuous Trading | Neuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Salah-Abou-El-Enien, A. and Vassilopoulos, P. | [2016] | C5 C57 C93 D44 D47 L50 |
| Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs | Holmberg, P. and Wolak, F. | [2015] | C72 D43 D44 L13 L94 |
| Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions | Anderson, E. and Holmberg, P. | [2015] | C62 C72 D43 D44 L94 |
| Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors | Newbery, D. M. | [2015] | L94 D44 |
| The Role of Distribution Network Operators in Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed Generation: Lessons from the United States for Europe | Anaya, K. and Pollitt, M. | [2014] | D44 L51 L94 Q28,Q48 |
| Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions | Holmberg, P. | [2014] | C72 D44 D45 |
| Supply function equilibria in transportation networks | Holmberg, P. and Philpott, A. | [2014] | D43 D44 C72 L91 |
| Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction | Greve, T. and Pollitt, M. | [2013] | D44 D86 E43 |
| Network Procurement Auctions | Greve, T. and Pollitt, M. | [2013] | D44 D85 |
| Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope | Holmberg, P. and Willems, B. | [2012] | JC73 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94 |
| Designing electiricty transmission auctions: an introduction to the relevant literature | Greve, T. and Pollitt, M. | [2012] | D44 L94 |
| Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing | Holmberg, P. and Lazarczyk, E. | [2012] | C72 D44 D61 L13 L94 |
| The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions | Holmberg, P. and Newbery, D. M. | [2010] | D43 D44 C62 L94 |
