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Faculty of Economics



Title AuthorsYearJEL Codes
Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demandAnderson, E., Holmberg, P.[2023]C72 D44 D82
Regulation of access, fees, and investment planning of transmission in Great BritainNewbery, D.[2023]D02 D44 H54 L51 L94 Q42
An evaluation of a local reactive power market: the case of Power PotentialAnaya, K. L. and Pollitt, M. G.[2021]D44 D47 L94 Q40
Designing an incentive-compatible efficient Renewable Electricity Support SchemeNewbery, D.[2021]D44 D62 D86 H23 H25 L94 Q28 Q42 Q48
The private and social value of British electrical interconnectorsNewbery, D., Gissey, G., Guo, B. and Dodds, P.[2019]C54 D40 D44 F14 D47 H23 L94 Q48
Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity MarketsAhlqvist, V., Holmberg, P., Tangeras, T.[2019]D44 L13 L94
Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit CommitmentEldridge, B., O’Neill, R., Hobbs, B.[2018]C60 C72 D44 D47 L94
Strategic behaviour in a capacity market? The new Irish electricity market designTeirilä, J., Ritz, R.[2018]D44 H57 L13 L94
UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: Emerging LessonsGrubb, M., Newbery, D.[2018]L94 D44
A system operator's utility function for the frequency response marketGreve, T., Teng, F., Pollitt, M. and Strbac, G.[2017]D44 L94
Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of IrelandTeirila, J.[2017]D43 D44 H57 L13 L94
What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?Newbery, D.[2017]D44 L51 L94 Q40 Q48 Q51
A future auction mechanism for distributed generationGreve, T. and Pollitt, M.[2016]D44 Q41
Economic zones for future complex power systemsGreve, T. and Greve, T. and Patsios C. and Pollitt, M. and Taylor, P.[2016]D44 D85 Q42
A VCG Auction for Electricity StorageGreve, T. and Pollitt, M.[2016]D44 D85 Q42
Intraday Markets for Power: Discretizing the Continuous TradingNeuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Salah-Abou-El-Enien, A. and Vassilopoulos, P.[2016]C5 C57 C93 D44 D47 L50
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costsHolmberg, P. and Wolak, F.[2015]C72 D43 D44 L13 L94
Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions Anderson, E. and Holmberg, P.[2015]C62 C72 D43 D44 L94
Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions and InterconnectorsNewbery, D. M.[2015]L94 D44
The Role of Distribution Network Operators in Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed Generation: Lessons from the United States for EuropeAnaya, K. and Pollitt, M.[2014]D44 L51 L94 Q28,Q48
Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctionsHolmberg, P.[2014]C72 D44 D45
Supply function equilibria in transportation networksHolmberg, P. and Philpott, A.[2014]D43 D44 C72 L91
Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract AuctionGreve, T. and Pollitt, M.[2013]D44 D86 E43
Network Procurement AuctionsGreve, T. and Pollitt, M.[2013]D44 D85
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slopeHolmberg, P. and Willems, B.[2012]JC73 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94
Designing electiricty transmission auctions: an introduction to the relevant literatureGreve, T. and Pollitt, M.[2012]D44 L94
Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricingHolmberg, P. and Lazarczyk, E.[2012]C72 D44 D61 L13 L94
The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity AuctionsHolmberg, P. and Newbery, D. M.[2010]D43 D44 C62 L94

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