

João Rafael CUNHA

PERSONAL DATA

EMAIL: jrsd2@cam.ac.uk
WEBSITE: <http://www.joaorafaelcunha.wixsite.com/home>
ADDRESS: University of Cambridge; Faculty of Economics; Austin Robinson Building;
Sidgwick Avenue; Cambridge CB3 9DD
NATIONALITY: Portuguese

EDUCATION

2018 (EXPECTED) PhD candidate in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, **Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies**, Geneva, Switzerland
2012 Master of Arts in ECONOMICS, **Rutgers University**, U.S.A.
2006 Undergraduate Degree in ECONOMICS, **University of Minho**, Portugal

EXPERIENCE

Current UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, U.K.
2017 *Researcher*

Current EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, Italy
2017 *Max Weber Fellow*

2014-2017 LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, U.K.
• *Marie Curie Research Fellow*
• *Guest Lecturer*
• *Teaching Assistant*

2016-2017 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LONDON, U.K.
Teaching Assistant

2013-2014 GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING FOR CENTRAL BANKS (BCC), Geneva, Switzerland
Research Assistant

2010-2012 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, U.S.A.
• *Instructor*
• *Research Assistant for Professor Michael Bordo*

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Finance, Monetary Economics, International Macroeconomics and Finance, Macroeconomics, Financial and Monetary History, Political Economy

RESEARCH

Job Market Paper

The Making of Financial Regulation - Voting on Financial Regulation in the U.S. Congress

Working Papers

Are Campaign Contributions a Lucrative Investment for Financial Companies? - Returns of Campaign Contributions

Investors as Politicians - How Do Politicians with Investments in Financial Companies Vote on Financial Regulation?

Work in Progress

Credit Cycles, Financial Crises and Medium-Term Economic Growth (with S. Solomou)

Testing the Financial Regulatory Cycle

Do Barriers to Entry in Banking Lead to Greater Stability? A Causal Inference Analysis (with W. Jansson)

AWARDS

Max Weber Fellowship

Marie Curie Fellowship

Academic Merit Award - University of Minho

SEMINARS & CONFERENCES

2017: European University Institute, Florence

2016: Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics Annual Congress, Lugano; ESH Seminar, Oxford University; BBL Seminar, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Regulation Workshop, European University Institute, Florence; Belgian Financial Research Forum, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels

2015: Banque de France Conference on "Economic History and Economic Policy", Banque de France, Paris; MacroHist Workshop, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Macro-Finance Workshop, Science Po, Paris

2014: MacroHist Workshop, Graduate Institute, Geneva; EABH Summer School in Financial and Monetary History, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Money and Finance

International Balance of Payments

Introduction to Macroeconomics

Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Business and Economic Performance since 1945: Britain in International Context

SHORT COURSES

- 2017: Masterclass on Foreign Exchange Market, University of Cambridge
2016: Spring School in Causal Inference in Applied Econometrics, Oxford University
2015: Summer School in Time Series Econometrics, Science Po, Paris;
Risk Management Issues in Central Counterparty Clearing, London School of Economics
2013: Financial Stability by Xavier Vives & Jean-Charles Rochet, Advanced Course in Economics for Doctoral Students and Faculty, Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland;
Financial Crises and Regulatory Responses by Patrick Bolton, Advanced Course in Economics for Doctoral Students and Faculty, Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland

SKILLS

SOFTWARE: STATA, Matlab, R, Eviews, GAUSS, Dynare, Oxmetrics, GiveWin, Latex
LANGUAGES: English (fluent); Portuguese (native); French (advanced); Spanish (advanced); Italian (intermediate); German (basic)

REFERENCES

Professor Ugo Panizza
ugo.panizza@graduateinstitute.ch
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2
Case Postale 136
CH1211 Geneva 21
Switzerland
Telephone: [+41] 22 908 59 52

Professor Rahul Mukherjee
rahul.mukherjee@graduateinstitute.ch
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2
Case Postale 136
CH1211 Geneva 21
Switzerland
Telephone: [+41] 22 908 59 27

Dr Solomos Solomou
ss19@cam.ac.uk
University of Cambridge
Faculty of Economics
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

Telephone: [+44] 1223 335200

Professor David Levine
david.levine@eui.eu
European University Institute
Department of Economics
Villa La Fonte
Via delle Fontanelle 18
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole
Italy
Telephone: [+39] 055 4685 913/866

PAPERS ABSTRACTS

Job Market Paper

The Making of Financial Regulation - Voting on Financial Regulation in the U.S. Congress

This paper studies the voting patterns of congressmen on financial regulation between 1991 and 2014. It uses the most comprehensive dataset assembled on campaign contributions from the financial sector and it is the first study taking a long-term perspective. It shows that campaign contributions are the strongest driver of congressional voting. This variable increases the likelihood of voting in favour of deregulatory bills.

Working Papers

Are Campaign Contributions a Lucrative Investment for Financial Companies? - Return on Investment of Campaign Contributions

This paper studies quantifiable returns of political involvement for U.S. financial companies. For this purpose, I construct a dataset with political and financial variables. This paper finds that the political engagement of financial companies is associated with lower probability, more risk-taking and a higher likelihood of being bailed-out.

Investors as Politicians - How Do Politicians with Investments in Financial Companies Behave as Financial Regulators?

This paper attempts to shed light into how the investment portfolio of legislators may influence their voting. Particularly looking at investments in financial companies, I show that having investments in financial companies is an important factor in the voting behavior of congressmen. Being an investor in financial causes an increase of around 9 percent in the likelihood of voting for a smaller regulatory burden increases even when controlling for other incentives and political and ideological preferences. I report they are especially relevant when voting for bills proposing to tighten financial regulation.