Research Interests

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Game theory, bargaining theory, industrial organisation and contract theory.

Biography

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Robert Evans is an economic theorist who has worked on, among other topics, bargaining theory and reputation in long-run relationships. Much of his recent work has been on contract theory and mechanism design, particularly in contexts in which parties are unable to commit fully to their agreements. He has published in leading international journals such as Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies and Journal of Economic Theory.

Recent Publications

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Published Papers

Evans, R. A. and Reiche, S. K. When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?, (2022) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming
Evans, R. A. and Reiche, S. K. Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation, (2015) Journal of Economic Theory
Evans, R. A. Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages, (2012) Econometrica
Evans, R. A. Simple efficient contracts in complex environments, (2008) Econometrica
Evans, R. A. and Reiche, S. K. Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility, (2008) Economics Letters

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

Evans, R., Park, I-U. Third-Party Sale of Information, (2022) CWPE2233
Evans, R. A., Reiche, S. K. When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?, (2022) CWPE2222

Teaching

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PI Paper 1 - Lent - General Equilibrium, Externalities, Welfare
PIIB Paper 4 - Michaelmas - Game Theory & Contract Theory with Applications
PIIB Paper 9 - Industrial Organisation: Theory

PhD Students

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