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Faculty of Economics

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Aidt, T. S.

Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

Constitutional Political Economy

Vol. 27(2) pp. 142-157 (2016)

Abstract: The paper studies the influence of Gordon Tullock (1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

Keywords: Rent seeking, Corruption

JEL Codes: D72

Author links: Toke Aidt  

Publisher's Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9



Cambridge Working Paper in Economics Version of Paper: Rent seeking and the economics of corruption, Aidt, T. S., (2016)

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