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Faculty of Economics

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Sabourian, H. and Lee, J.

Efficient repeated implementation


Vol. 79(6) pp. 1967-1994 (2011)

Abstract: This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period. An SCF is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that its Nash equilibrium set is nonempty and every equilibrium outcome path results in the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty. We show, with minor qualifications, that in the complete information environment an SCF is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it is efficient. We also discuss several extensions of our analysis.

Author links: Hamid Sabourian  

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