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Faculty of Economics

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Block, J. I. and Levine, D. K.

Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games

International Journal of Game Theory

Abstract: We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.

Keywords: Repeated gameFolk theoremSelf-referential game Approximate equilibrium

JEL Codes: D01, D03, D82

Publisher's Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2



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