Goyal, S. and Vigier, A.
Attack, Defense and Contagion in Networks
CWPE1451
Abstract: Connections between individuals facilitate the exchange of goods, resources and information and create
benefits. These connections may be exploited by adversaries to spread their attacks as well. What is the
optimal way to design and defend networks in the face of attacks?
We develop a model with a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer moves first and chooses a
network and an allocation of defense resources across nodes. The Adversary then allocates attack
resources on nodes; if an attack succeeds then the Adversary decides on how successful resources should
navigate the network.
We obtain two principal results. One, we show that in a wide variety of circumstances a star
network with all defence resources allocated to the central node is optimal for the Designer. Two, we
identify conditions on the technology of conflict, network value function and the resource configuration
for which networks with multiple hubs/components are optimal.
Keywords: Networks, computer security, Tullock contests, connectivity
Author links: Sanjeev Goyal
PDF: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1451.pdf 
Open Access Link: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5675
Published Version of Paper: Attack, defence and contagion in networks, Goyal, S. and Vigier, A., Review of Economic Studies (2014)
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