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Faculty of Economics

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Shvets, J.

Presidential control of the judiciary via the appointment of power: evidence from Russia

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization


Abstract: In many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges. Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of Russia, where judges are often said to favor the executive. I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges selected by the president favor the government more than do their peers. In the process, the article develops a new solution to the sample selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions.

JEL Codes: D02, K40, P37

Author links: Julia Shvets  

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Papers and Publications

Recent Publications

Porzio, T., Rossi, F. and Santangelo, G. The Human Side of Structural Transformation American Economic Review [2022]

Huffman, D., Raymond, C. and Shvets, J. Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers American Economic Review [2022]

Bhattacharya, D. and Komarova, T. Incorporating Social Welfare in Program-Evaluation and Treatment Choice Review of Economics and Statistics, accepted [2023]

Rauh, C. and Valladares-Esteban, A. On the Black-White Gaps in Labor Supply and Earnings over the Lifecycle in the US Review of Economic Dynamics [2023]