skip to content

Faculty of Economics

Journal Cover

Block, J. I. and Levine, D. K.

Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games

International Journal of Game Theory

Vol. 45(166) pp. 1-14 (2016)

Abstract: We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.

Keywords: Repeated gameFolk theoremSelf-referential game Approximate equilibrium

JEL Codes: D01, D03, D82

Author links: Juan Block  

Publisher's Link:

Papers and Publications

Recent Publications

Galeotti, A., Golub, B. and Goyal, S. Targeting Interventions in Networks Econometrica [2020]

Ambrus, A. and Elliott, M. Investments in Social Ties, Risk Sharing, and Inequality Review of Economic Studies [2020]

Dziubinski, M., Goyal, S. and Minarsch, D. E. N. The Strategy of Conquest Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming [2020]

Li, Z. M., Laeven, R. J. A. and Vellekoop, M. H. Dependent Microstructure Noise and Integrated Volatility: Estimation from High-Frequency Data Journal of Econometrics [2020]