Block, J. I. and Levine, D. K.
Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games
International Journal of Game Theory
Vol. 45(166) pp. 1-14 (2016)
Abstract: We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.
Keywords: Repeated gameFolk theoremSelf-referential game Approximate equilibrium
JEL Codes: D01, D03, D82
Author links: Juan Block
Publisher's Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2 
