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Faculty of Economics

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Aidt, T. S. and Albornoz, F.

Political regimes and foreign intervention

Journal of Development Economics

Vol. 94(2) pp. 192-201 (2011)

Abstract: We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world

JEL Codes: D72, D74, H71, 015, P16

Author links: Toke Aidt  

Publisher's Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.016



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