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Faculty of Economics

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Evans, R. A. and Reiche, S. K.

Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility

Economics Letters

Vol. 99(3) pp. 611-614 (2008)

Abstract: Bester and Strausz [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2001. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the single agent case. Econometrica 69, 1077–1098] showed that the revelation principle is invalid in a multi-agent, no-commitment setting. We show that if transfers are possible it does apply in their setting unless at least two agents have private information.

JEL Codes: D23

Author links: Robert Evans  

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