skip to content

Faculty of Economics

Journal Cover

Evans, R. A. and Reiche, S. K.

Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility

Economics Letters

Vol. 99(3) pp. 611-614 (2008)

Abstract: Bester and Strausz [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2001. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the single agent case. Econometrica 69, 1077–1098] showed that the revelation principle is invalid in a multi-agent, no-commitment setting. We show that if transfers are possible it does apply in their setting unless at least two agents have private information.

JEL Codes: D23

Author links: Robert Evans  

Publisher's Link:

Papers and Publications

Recent Publications

Ambrus, A. and Elliott, M. Investments in Social Ties, Risk Sharing, and Inequality Review of Economic Studies [2021]

Onatski, A. and Wang, C. Spurious Factor Analysis Econometrica [2021]

Bhattacharya, D. Nonparametric Approaches to Empirical Welfare Analysis Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming [2023]

Anagnostopoulos, A., Atesagaoglu, O. E., Faraglia, E. and Giannitsarou, C. Cross-Country Stock Market Comovement: A Macro Perspective Journal of Monetary Economics [2022]