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Faculty of Economics


Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Title AuthorsYearJEL Codes
Market Segmentation Through InformationElliott, M., Galeotti., A., Koh., A, and Li, W.[2021]D43 D83 L13
Generalized linear competition: From pass-through to policyGenakos, C., Grey, F., and Ritz, R.[2020]D43 H23 L51 L93
Mergers, Mavericks, and Tacit CollusionDarai, D., Roux, C., Schneider, F.[2019]C91 D43 K21 L13 L41
Does competition increase pass-through?Ritz, R.[2019]D24 D41 D42 D43
Market Power and Spatial Competition in Rural IndiaChatterjee, S.[2019]D43 F12 L13 L81 O13 Q13 R12
Production efficiency of nodal and zonal pricing in imperfectly competitive electricity marketsSarfati, M., Hesamzadeh, M-R., Holmberg, P.[2019]C61 C72 D43 L13 L94
Strengths and Weaknesses of the British Market ModelNewbery, D.[2019]D43,D47 H23 L94 Q48 Q54
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part II: Solution AlgorithmSarfatia, M., Hesamzadeha, M., Holmberg, P.[2018]C61 C63 C72 D43 L13 L94
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part I: Concept AnalysisSarfatia, M., Hesamzadeha, M., Holmberg, P.[2018]C61 C63 C72 D43 L13 L94
Pass-through, profits and the political economy of regulationGrey, F., Ritz, R.[2018]D43 H23 L51 L92 Q54
Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market DesignsHesamzadeh, M., Holmberg, P., Sarfati, M.[2018]C61 C63 C72 D43 D47 L13 L94
Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of IrelandTeirila, J.[2017]D43 D44 H57 L13 L94
Oligopolistic competition and welfareRitz, Robert A.[2016]D42 D43 D61 L20 L40
Contracting in a market with differential informationRocha, M. and Greve, T.[2016]D43 D82 L13
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costsHolmberg, P. and Wolak, F.[2015]C72 D43 D44 L13 L94
The robustness of industrial commodity oligopoly pricing strategies Newbery, D. M. and Greve, T.[2015]C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94
Why corporations in developing countries are likely to be even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international finance than their counterparts in the developed world: A Tribute to Ajit SinghPalma, J. G.[2015]B50 D30 D43 E20 F30 F60 G10 G20 G30 N16 N16 016
Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions Anderson, E. and Holmberg, P.[2015]C62 C72 D43 D44 L94
Strategic investment and international spillovers in natural gas marketsRitz, R. A.[2015]D43 F12 L25 L95
Supply function equilibria in transportation networksHolmberg, P. and Philpott, A.[2014]D43 D44 C72 L91
The Strategic Robustness of Mark-up EquilibriaNewbery, D. M. and Greve, T.[2013]C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94
On welfare losses due to imperfect competitionRitz, R. A.[2013]D43 D61 L13 L22 L41
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slopeHolmberg, P. and Willems, B.[2012]JC73 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94
Emissions Trading with Profit-Neutral Permit AllocationsHepburn, C. J., Quah, J.-H. and Ritz, R. A.[2012]D43 H23 Q58
The roubstness of agent-based models of electricity wholesale marketsNewbery, D. M.[2012]C63 C73 D43 L10 L13 L94
The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity AuctionsHolmberg, P. and Newbery, D. M.[2010]D43 D44 C62 L94

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